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NOTICING THE GOVERNMENT’S VOICE
AND PONDERING ITS IMPLICATIONS
THE
GOVERNMENT’S
SPEECH
AND
THE
CONSTITUTION. By Helen Norton* Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge University Press. 2019. Pp. i + 242. $29.99
(paperback).
Leslie Gielow Jacobs1
INTRODUCTION
“[M]uch, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through
speech . . . .”2 Justice Breyer’s observation occurred amidst his
dissent from the Court’s choice to pay greater attention and direct
heightened constitutional concern to government regulation of
the ordinary exchange activities of private citizens, which occur
by means of speech. In The Government’s Speech and the
Constitution, Helen Norton, too, seeks to expose and
acknowledge the ubiquity and daily impact of speech. As the title
indicates, however, she flips her focus from the more usual
emphasis on the government as regulator of private speech to the
acts and impacts of the government as speaker. It is the
government’s speech that, in her view, deserves greater popular
and judicial attention than it has yet received . . . and heightened
constitutional concern.
Norton’s book follows Mark Yudof’s When Government
Speaks.3 Legal scholars and courts, Yudof worried, had “failed to
grapple with the realities of communication in the twentieth
* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado Law School.
1. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Professor of Law & Director, Capital Center for
Law & Policy, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Thanks to Emma
Woidtke for excellent cite checking assistance.
2. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
3. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
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century,” specifically the massive power of the government to
“dominate[] the flow of ideas and information” and thereby
falsify consent.4 His book aimed to evaluate the extent of the
problem the government’s speech poses to democracy, expose the
failure of classic First Amendment theory to identify and address
it, and assess the abilities of various actors, by various means, to
counteract the government’s power in the speech market. The
danger Yudof identified was structural. The salient injury was “to
us all.”5 And the aspiration was “the creation of a structure for
government and nongovernment communication that enhances
autonomy, choice, and respect for the person” to correct the
communication loop between government and citizens to put
citizens in control.6 Constitutional doctrine, and the role of courts
in implementing the changes he suggested, appeared as but one
part of a survey of democratic and communications theory and
research and recommendations aimed at broad, systemic change.7
Yudof hoped the book would “spark scholarly debate of longneglected issues,” and it did.8
Fast forward to the twenty-first century and the realities of
communication, the government’s power to communicate relative
to its constituents and others seeking influence over them, and
constitutional doctrine have changed. The rise of the internet and
social media has augmented the government’s power to
communicate more widely and in new ways. But private
corporations own and operate these vast, wide-open spaces for
public communication and control the gates, foreign governments
vie to manipulate consent according to an agenda that may, or
may not, align with the interests of the current American national
government, algorithms available to the highest bidder shape
citizen opinions and political behavior, and constitutional
doctrine increasingly privileges corporate power to communicate
free from government restraint. “Government speech” has
become a recognized category within the subset of Free Speech
4. Id. at xv.
5. Id. at 164.
6. Id. at 89.
7. Id. at 259 (“Courts . . . are risky guardians of government expression that may
falsify consent. And the risk is greatest when direct constitutional limits are imposed.”).
8. Id. at xvi; Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 373 (1983) (book review); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech and the Falsification
of Consent, 96 HARV. L. REV., 1745 (1983) (book review); Mark V. Tushnet, Talking to
Each Other: Reflections on Yudof’s When Government Speaks, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 129
(1984) (book review).
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Clause doctrine where the government facilitates private speech.
And the internet and social media have compounded and made
more visible the severe harms to individual autonomy, choice, and
security that specific instances of speech by government or
nongovernment actors may cause.
Norton builds on Yudof’s call to recognize the omnipresence
and dangers of the government’s speech, but shifts her gaze. She
sets her sights firmly on constitutional doctrine and focuses her
concern on how the government’s speech may violate individual
rights. “What are the constitutional rules that govern [the
government’s speech] choices?” she asks (p. 5). Norton’s purpose
with respect to that question, for the most part, is to provide a
framework to aid readers to think more clearly about what those
rules should be, rather than to advocate for particular results. And
Norton seeks to reach a wide swath of readers beyond legal
scholars and courts. The book is part of a series directed at
providing “experts, teachers, policymakers, students, social
activists, and educated citizens” “contexts for understanding
contemporary . . . dilemmas” and “in-depth analyses of theories,
existing and past conditions, and constructive ideas for legal
advancements.”9 Norton adds that she hopes that anyone who is
“interested in the uses and abuses of government power”—the
core subject of constitutional law in her view—will engage with
the questions and issues in her book (p. 10).
Speaking effectively to readers with such varying levels of
expertise in a discussion about constitutional doctrine is a
challenging task. The niche of doctrine that Norton seeks to
isolate—the rules that apply to “what the government says”—
exists within the much more vast and complicated doctrine of
“what the government does” (p. 3). The slim book covers a lot of
ground. This includes two distinct doctrinal questions—how to
define government speech and what rules should limit it. The first
exists against the complex background of government processes
and the many different ways that government entities may
interact with private speakers. The second draws from theory and
doctrine that apply to at least four separate constitutional rights
9. The series is the Cambridge Studies on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, edited by
Alexander Tsesis. The quotation comes from the series’ web page. Cambridge Studies on
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, https://www.cambridge.org
/core/series/cambridge-studies-on-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties
/D30BD9E3FF24C27B641FDFB5E325DAF1 (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
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provisions. Additionally, the book is about reasoning from the
core values that underpin constitutional provisions, not about the
theories of interpretation that lead to choices among those core
values. So, theories appear as “approaches to,” or
“understandings” about, constitutional meaning, without further
grounding in methodology, the judicial role, or legitimacy.
Readers are told to check their “reactions” and “preferences”
among the doctrinal possibilities, and to understand that their
different “feelings” trace to their own “theor[ies] of the values
underlying the constitutional provision in question” (pp. 92, 141).
Kind and reasonable people, Norton cautions, may reach
different conclusions about constitutional meaning and
applications to particular instances of government speech.
Provoking principled decision making about the “hard and
important” questions raised by government speech is her goal,
and prodding readers to recognize the “nuances and
complexities” inherent in these constitutional judgments is a step
toward it (p. 22).
Some legal experts may chafe at the generalizations
necessary to cover so much ground and the lack of interpretative
grounding, while even highly motivated lay readers may struggle
to gain the context to engage in the principled thinking about
constitutional doctrine that Norton seeks to provoke. But these
are the extremes. Norton aims wide and, for the most part, hits
the sweet spot. The book is one of a kind in isolating government
speech and compiling examples across the doctrines of multiple
constitutional rights. For legal experts, she shakes up familiar
terrain, offering groupings of behaviors, theories, and cases, which
some of us may dispute, but which, by means of the novel
presentation, make all of us see the doctrine differently, and think
about it—which is what she set out to do. For policymakers and
advocates, the book provides a unique first-stop overview as they
consider strategies and options to address harmful government
speech. For those less learned in the law, the book’s clear
structure, conversational narrative, engaging examples, concise
summaries of theories and cases, and patient explanations make
its content accessible, relevant, and interesting, and thus likely to
fulfill the book’s purpose of provoking clear thinking about the
values and dangers of government speech.
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I. THE FRAMEWORKS
“Governments must speak in order to govern,” Norton
begins (p. 1). By means of chapters, sections, subsections, and
guideposts in the text, Norton methodically slices through the
universe of constitutional doctrine as she directs readers to the
specific questions the book addresses. The first slice is the most
significant, excising force-of-law government actions to isolate the
focus of book: the distinct power of speech as exercised by the
government. “The government is unique among speakers,”
Norton cautions, “because of its coercive power as sovereign, its
considerable resources, its privileged access to key information,
and its wide variety of speaking roles” (p. 11). Norton begins by
mapping out the government’s many and varied audiences,
speakers, and types of speech choices. The audience includes
listeners, internal and external, domestic and foreign. The
speakers may be individuals or entities, located in all three
branches of government, and at all levels, federal, state and local.
The speech choices include what to say, how to say it, and to
whom, and what not to say, by means of a decision to keep a secret
or not to express a point of view (pp. 11–22). This prelude
“attune[s] our ear to the government’s voice” (p. 11), primes us to
“recognize its presence in, and assess its impact on, our daily
lives,” (pp. 10–11), and cues the book’s core question: “When
does the speech of this unusually powerful speaker violate our
constitutional rights and liberties?” (p. 3).
Norton proposes a framework for thinking through this big
question, which further partitions the constitutional questions
that surround the government’s speech. Her project draws on the
many articles she has authored on government speech (pp. viii–
ix). The earlier pieces concern the boundaries of the “government
speech” category, or defense, which was “recently minted” at the
time she wrote.10 The later pieces survey the harms that
government speech may wreak, explore whether those harms may
be cognizable within the doctrine of selected individual rights
guarantees, and consider possible remedies. The framework she
proposes and the chapters of the book mirror this sequence.
Norton’s framework asks us to direct our thinking through two
“stages” (p. 5). First-stage problems “force us to untangle

10. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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competing governmental and private claims to the same speech”
(p. 5). Second-stage problems require readers to “consider
whether and when the government’s speech infringes specific
constitutional rights” (p. 5).
A. STAGE ONE
First-stage government speech problems—the topic of
chapter one—occur in the subset of instances where the
government seeks to control the content or viewpoints of speech
the speaker asserts is privately expressed. The question in these
instances is whether the government acts as speaker on its own
behalf or regulator of private speech.11 The answer matters
because the Free Speech Clause limits differ dramatically,
imposing little or no restraint on the government’s discretion to
tailor the message of its own speech12 and strict limits on
government’s ability to censor the content of private speech.13
Norton begins with a plain-English explanation of the
location of the government speech defense within free speech
doctrine and its significance.14 The chapter then traces the genesis
11. These instances include when private individuals deliver or contribute to speech
in government programs or on government property, when they speak with government
funding, and when they speak as government employees. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991) (holding when health care providers deliver speech pursuant to a government
program with rules that prohibit discussing abortion the product is government speech);
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (concluding that, when beef
producers are required by regulation to fund a government advertising campaign
promoting generic beef, the product is government speech); Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(holding that, when private organizations donated monuments displayed in a public park,
the product is government speech); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (stating
that when public employees speak within the scope of their official duties, the product is
subject to the control of the government employer). But cf. Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833–34 (1995) (distributing public university
funds to student groups, for the purpose of promoting a broad exchange of viewpoints, is
individual speech).
12. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (“Government is not restrained by the First
Amendment from controlling its own expression”) (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139, n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring))).
13. Id. at 469 (noting that any government restriction of private speech “based on the
content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny” (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))); id. at 470 (explaining that, even when
government property does not constitute a traditional public forum, to which public access
is constitutionally required, when a government entity creates a more limited forum for
“private speakers,” access rules must be “reasonable and viewpoint neutral” (citing Good
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001))).
14. P. 27 (“First, some background.”); p. 28 (“The Court’s government speech
doctrine thus provides the government with a defense, a shield, from Free Speech Clause
challenges brought by private speakers . . . .”).
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and evolution of the government speech defense, through review
of the Court’s decisions. This is a very complicated doctrinal area,
intersecting with the complex law that governs legislative and
administrative procedures, and the terms that attach to
government programs, and with the notoriously obscure judicially
created forum doctrine. Norton does a good job explaining the
facts and reasoning of the decisions, with helpful italicized
headline quotes introducing the cases and summarizing the
movement in the doctrine each accomplished. The series of cases,
Norton explains, “reveals the Court’s learning curve,” and
through her review, “we can watch the Court teach itself about
government speech” (p. 31). These lessons learned are, first, that
the government must speak to function effectively, that it may
spend taxpayer dollars to deliver its own messages, and that when
it does so, the strict rules that limit the government’s power to
dictate the content of private speech do not apply. Second,
although the content of the government’s speech choices are not
politically examinable, they remain subject to political checks.
Third, and most recently, while a realm of government speech
must exist for democratic governance to work, it is a doctrine
“susceptible to dangerous misuse,” and so the Court will “exercise
great caution” when faced with appeals to extend it lest the
government “silence or muffle the expression of disfavored
viewpoints” in the guise of broadcasting its own speech (p. 41).
The case review both marks where we are and “guide[s] our
thinking about how to go forward” (p. 30). Norton then offers her
“framework for approaching the challenging first-stage problems
to come” (p. 30). Norton’s “framework” is application of “what
[she] call[s] the transparency principle—that is, an insistence that
the governmental source of a message be transparent to the
public” (p. 30). “[T]he value of the government’s speech,” Norton
explains, “springs primarily from its capacity to inform the public
about its government’s principles and priorities” so that the
citizenry has “more information with which to evaluate [its]
government” (p. 43). This value obtains only when “the
governmental source of a message is clear to the public at the time
of its delivery” (p. 44). Programmatic directives are difficult for
ordinary citizens to find, government speakers are inclined to
obscure their identities to gain the credibility of private speakers
or otherwise to “manipulate the public’s attitudes toward its
views,” and nongovernmental speakers may seek to “mislead
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their listeners” by falsely claiming the government’s imprimatur
for their own views (pp. 44–45). Therefore, Norton continues, the
government must “transparently tak[e] political responsibility for
its expressive choices” as a condition to gaining the benefit of the
government speech defense (p. 44). Expressly marking speech as
its own, she says, is easy and costless for government speakers to
do (p. 45). She identifies “source clues” to guide listeners’ and
courts’ assessment of speaker identify, and proposes a “doctrinal
incentive” for government speakers to mark their speech with
“express cues,” whereby the presence of such cues “trigger[s] a
presumption that a contested message is governmental in origin,”
and their absence creates a presumption that the government may
not invoke the government speech defense (p. 46).
Norton then reconsiders the Court’s cases in light of her
proposed transparency principle. Cases “early in its learning
curve” do not follow her prescription (p. 49). The government
source of a regulatory mandate that doctors and other employees
of funded family planning programs refrain from discussing
abortion was not “apparent to listeners—that is, patients—at the
time of the message’s delivery” (p. 50). This source confusion may
have misled those patients to evaluate the counseling as if it were
the product of the health professionals’ unrestricted opinion and
expertise. The government’s “failure to own up to the message”
thus inflicted “constitutional injury” (p. 50). Similarly, viewers
“watching the ads while sitting at home in their living rooms”
would not understand that a message labeled “Funded by
America’s Beef Producers” was actually directed by the
government (p. 51). The Court’s view that the terms of the
program contained in published regulations sufficiently revealed
the source of the speech was “an insider’s view of accountability,
a judicial choice to privilege form over function” when
“transparency would have cost the government nothing while
providing value to the public” (p. 51). The transparency principle
also shows, Norton claims, why the circumstance of specialty
license plate messages present “a hard case” (p. 51). The graphics
are placed on a government-created product under the state’s
name, but proposed by individuals and displayed on their
property. So, the source cues cut both ways. Norton concludes
that, in these types of instances of apparently combined
government/private messaging, the message should be viewed as
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the government’s, with individuals free to acquire it and display it
as their own, or not (p. 51).
Norton next applies the transparency principle framework to
project resolutions to future first-stage issues. New expressive
technologies should not confuse application of the core principle
that the government must expressly own the speech it generates.
Where the government engages in one-way digital expression, on
websites and through social media, the speech is its own. Where it
invites the public to interact on the sites, and share views, the rules
that restrict the government’s ability to regulate private speech
should apply (pp. 53–55). And “a commitment to transparency
should preclude the government’s use of opaque technologies that
conceal the governmental source of speech,” like sock puppetry
and “deep fake” technologies (p. 55). The transparency principle
can help guide resolution of whether a government official, like
the president, speaks for the government, subject to constitutional
rules, or as a private citizen on social media sites and elsewhere
(pp. 56–57). The “nature, scope, and power of the speaker’s
governmental position,” as well as the expression’s topic—of
public or private concern—and its audience can inform the
inquiry (p. 57).
Additionally, the transparency principle contradicts the
Court’s conclusion that the government may control as its own
speech employee speech delivered pursuant to their official
duties15 (p. 61). The Court’s “wooden bright-line rule” fails to
balance the public value of government transparency, in the form
of whistle-blowing and other work-related speech, against the
government’s interest in workplace control and efficiency (pp. 63–
65). A rule that better accommodates the “democracy-enhancing
value of the government’s speech” “would permit the government
to claim the power to control the speech of its employees as its
own only when it has specifically commissioned or hired those
employees to deliver a transparently governmental viewpoint for
which the public can hold it accountable” (p. 64). Employee
speech that does not meet “this demanding transparency-based
test for government speech” should be subject to the balancing
test that applied before the current rule,16 or else supervisors
remain free to discipline internal whistle-blowers “with impunity,
15. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410.
16. For the balancing test that applied prior, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143
(1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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chilling valuable expression to the public’s detriment” (pp. 65–
66).
B. STAGE TWO
The bulk of the book deals with the second-stage problems
of “whether and when the government’s speech itself infringes
specific constitutional rights” (p. 23). Separate chapters cover the
intersection of government speech with the rights guaranteed by
the Establishment, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses. The final chapter surveys the
range of possible remedies in and out of court to constrain
harmful government speech.
Norton begins with the Establishment Clause because it is
“the area in which courts and commentators to date have most
often wrestled with whether and when the government’s speech,
by itself, violates the Constitution” (pp. 69–70). The structure of
the chapter forms the template for the chapters that follow. The
approaches Norton draws from Establishment Clause doctrine
and commentary form the second-stage framework of three
questions about the characteristics of a particular instance of
government speech—its effects or purpose—she applies to each
constitutional provision. The purpose of the framework, Norton
cautions repeatedly, is to guide readers’ thinking in an orderly
way through the many second-stage considerations, rather than to
resolve them (p. 92). Her goal is to explore and reveal the
approaches’ “various strengths as well as their limitations,” their
“difficulties, gaps, and ambiguities,” so we can consider for
ourselves what the resolutions should be (pp. 9, 26). “The more
we recognize the volume and variety of the government’s speech
in our lives,” and the better we understand “the complexities of
the constitutional questions triggered by the government’s
speech,” “the more thoughtfully we can puzzle over its
constitutional implications” (p. 233).
Chapter two begins with an imaginary application that places
the reader in the midst of a situation where the government’s
speech intersects with the Establishment Clause mandate.
Examples of other current controversies involving government
speech and religion further draw the reader in (pp. 68–69). A
background section introduces the anti-establishment mandate,
offers options as to its meaning, and identifies three “approaches”
to identifying which characteristics of government speech signal a

JACOBS 36:1

2021]

7/6/2021 11:09 PM

BOOK REVIEWS

159

constitutional violation—noncoercion, nonendorsement, and
neutrality (p. 70). Separate sections lead readers through
applications of each of these approaches in cases and examples,
noting where their advocates agree and disagree, and tracing
those opinions to different choices about constitutional meaning
(pp. 71–85). A section that follows compares and contrasts the
approaches in action17 (pp. 85–88).
Norton’s conclusion establishes the framework for the
discussion in the chapters that follow. The Establishment Clause
approaches, she suggests, can be “tools for thinking about secondstage government speech problems more generally” (p. 92). From
these provision-specific approaches, Norton draws the series of
three questions aimed at identifying the circumstances under
which government speech may violate other constitutional rights
guarantees. The first two questions ask about the effects of the
government’s speech. Question one asks “whether and when the
government’s speech changes its listeners’ choices or
opportunities in ways that would violate a specific constitutional
provision if the government accomplished those same changes
through its lawmaking or other regulatory actions” (p. 8). The
second inquires whether the government’s speech “inflicts
expressive, or dignitary, harm upon its targets” by “treating them
as outsiders to the political community, by failing to treat them
with equal concern and respect because of who they are or what
they believe” (p. 8). The third addresses the government’s
purpose for speaking, and asks “whether the constitutional
provision at issue denies the government the power to speak for
[those reasons]” (p. 9). “Our answers to and our preferences
among these questions,” we are told, “will be informed in part by
our theory of the values underlying the constitutional provision in
question” (p. 92).
Chapter three, which addresses government speech and
equality, does a particularly good job of providing the information
readers need to trace their conclusions about the constitutionality
of specific instances of government speech back into core values
that determine the scope and applications of the equal protection
guarantee. The presentation follows the template, with a robust
presentation of historical and current examples of “the good” and
“the bad and the ugly” government speech (pp. 94–103).
17.

Norton includes a final note on justiciability (pp. 88–92).
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Importantly, in the background section, before posing and
addressing the triad of questions, Norton includes brief sketches
of what she identifies as the two leading theories of the values the
equal protection guarantee implements—anti-classification and
anti-subordination (pp. 104–06). These sketches allow readers to
ground their preferences about constitutional meaning at the
outset, and to check their conclusions about the constitutionality
of the many and various instances of government speech set out
in the text against this grounding.
The section that addresses the first question presents cases
involving speech that causes concrete consequences to its targets,
subdivides into speech aimed at third parties, commanding,
coercing, or encouraging them to discriminate against the targets,
and speech aimed at the targets themselves (pp. 106–12). Finding
the point at which the value to individuals of restricting speech
outweighs the public value of permitting the government to speak
without restriction, Norton notes, “forces us to grapple with
important and difficult questions about the requisite causal
connection between the government’s speech and discriminatory
consequences” (p. 107). The section addressing expressive, or
dignitary, harm asks whether “the Equal Protection Clause
den[ies] the government the power simply to say that its targets
are inferior or second-class citizens because of their race or other
class status,” even if the speech inflicts no concrete harm (p. 112).
This section compares application of the two theories, rather than
presenting cases, and draws a connection between criticisms of an
expressive harm approach to the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause and those levelled against the non-endorsement approach
to the Establishment Clause (p. 115).
The third section explains that a purpose to discriminate
signals unconstitutional action under the equal protection
guarantee, and asks, “does it also limit the government’s power to
speak, without more, when motivated by animus?” (pp. 117–18).
Norton offers a hypothetical public school announcement that it
will stop teaching Latino history as an example of this type of
“soft” speech that does not attach to force-of-law action, and
notes the difficulty of identifying animus as the intent behind
government behavior and the dangers of branding government
decision-makers as motivated by it (pp. 118–19). The section that
compares and contrasts the three approaches uses the engaging
and timely example of display by various government bodies of
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the Confederate flag, addressed in depth by a number of lower
courts, and returns to the example that opened the chapter, of
state laws that require public schools to include anti-gay teaching
in their sex education curriculums (pp. 119–24). In separate
paragraphs, with respect to the curriculum example, Norton
helpfully maps out the questions, issues, and potential conclusions
that flow from a focus on harm to class members’ choices or
opportunities, expressive harm, and the motivations for
government speech (pp. 124–26).
Norton again eschews persuasion in favor of a purpose to
provoke thought. The problems raised by the material, she
explains, “force us to think hard about the meaning of equality,
about when the government’s speech threatens our conception of
equality, and about our hierarchy of values when we weigh the
costs and benefits of constraining the government’s speech related
to equality” (p. 126). Next, however, we see the flicker of
normativity that underpins the stage-two project of the book. Yes,
she acknowledges, the difficulties that attach to the inquiry into
the constitutionality of particular instances of government speech
“may mean that even the nastiest of the government’s expressive
choices may only rarely violate the Constitution” (p. 126). Then
she concludes: “[b]ut the answer to the question: ‘When does the
government’s speech violate the Equal Protection Clause’ is not
‘never,’ but instead ‘sometimes’” (p. 126).
Chapter four addresses the government’s speech and due
process. Examples involve the clause’s substantive and procedural
components, including criminal procedure applications. The
chapter focuses on the government’s lies, but also includes speech
that discloses private information or humiliates its targets (p. 127).
It follows the familiar format, once again including a nice
prefatory section setting out historical and current examples of
the government’s lies (pp. 128–34). The chapter asks, “[w]hen, if
ever, does the government’s speech deprive its targets of ‘life,
liberty, or property’?” (p. 134). We are told that “[o]ur theory of
the Due Process Clause and the nature of the liberty and property
interests that it protects” will “drive our doctrinal preferences, our
reactions to the various approaches for considering the[] secondstage government speech problems [in this chapter]” (pp. 134–35).
This time, however, we do not receive sketches of the possible
core meanings of the clause, and more specific meanings of
“liberty” and “property,” which readers who do not know this
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area of constitutional law well may miss when they attempt to
follow the instruction to trace their reactions to specific instances
of speech to fundamental values.
Instead, the sections modeled on the three questions
proceed, with multiple subsections covering broad terrain. These
sections combine information in new and interesting ways, and
provoke thought about the constitutional implications of a wide
variety of types of government speech. Some readers may have to
stop and catch their breath, and think hard about whether they
agree with the labeling and groupings of cases, and the
progression of the reasoning across disparate applications within
the same provision. But, of course, that’s the point. Norton
employs here the sequenced methodology apparent throughout
the book. These characteristics of government speech, which form
the basis of the three-question framework, proceed generally
along a spectrum from already recognized in the doctrine as
unconstitutional to only theorized. The discussion within these
sections often employs this sequencing as well. Here, the section
addressing the first question, speech that coerces or unduly
burdens its targets’ liberties, leads with cases finding a
constitutional violation when the government’s lies lead to a
defendant’s wrongful imprisonment or coerces suspects to give up
their constitutional rights. After establishing that this type of
speech may sometimes violate the Due Process Clause, Norton
acknowledges that “relevant judicial precedent outside the
criminal justice setting is slim,” but suggests “we can nevertheless
build upon this analysis to identify other circumstances” in which
the government’s lies or threats to engage in unlawful conduct
may violate the due process guarantee (p. 140). These
applications include speech that burdens women’s reproductive
rights, denies voting rights, discloses private information, and
inflicts reputational harm. While the applications can be dizzying,
repetition of the same analytical structure within this chapter, and
others, builds familiarity in the reader, and allows the reader to
engage in sequential comparison, within each chapter, and within
the subparts.
Chapter five explores whether and when the government’s
speech may violate individual free speech rights, by causing the
harm of silencing individual speech or humiliating or disparaging
its targets, or being uttered with the intent to silence others’
speech (pp. 158–73). A separate section asks whether and when
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the Free Press Clause limits government speech beyond the
strictures of the free speech guarantee and helpfully ties the
exploration of options to core values distinct to the free press
guarantee (pp. 176–82).
Chapter six covers the government’s speech that takes sides
in political contests. The constitutional concern, Norton notes, is
the one that sparked Yudof’s book—that government will
indoctrinate its citizenry rather than respond to, and implement,
its will (p. 186). The chapter presents examples, by means of cases
and theory, of the many ways government entities may engage in
dangerous election speech (pp. 187–204), and contains a
thoughtful final section evaluating the values and dangers of such
advocacy (pp. 205–11).
The final chapter addresses responses to the government’s
harmful speech. These include remedies that are available
through courts or legislatures, or could be, counter-speech by
government and nongovernment actors, including the press, and
more general “pushback” through politics, protests, and other
activities from “the rest of us” (p. 234) against abusive
government speech.
II. THOUGHTS ON THE “HARD AND IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS” RAISED
Norton’s endeavor is ambitious and grand, pulling from
“pockets of theory and doctrine . . . to stitch together a coherent
framework for understanding the relationship between the
government’s speech and our constitutional rights” (p. 26). The
hard work is obvious, as are the difficult decisions of what to
include and what to omit. Her purpose is to spark reactions and
prompt thinking about the complicated and nuanced
constitutional implications of government speech, and in that she
succeeds. Many thoughts crossed my mind as I read through the
book. I will offer a few of them here.
A. STAGE ONE
1. Structure
On a first read, chapter one, which sets out the first-stage
framework, proceeds according to an expected scholarly format.
Norton explains the doctrine, locates the deficiency, proposes a
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solution, and defends it. Norton’s defense of the transparency
principle’s core requirement is thorough, cogent, and, to many of
us, convincing.18 It is not the law, however, and despite Norton’s
optimism that the Court remains on a “learning curve” with
respect to this issue (p. 31), the odds are against it becoming part
of the law anytime soon.19
The transparency principle embeds a choice among
competing values that may explain the meaning of the free speech
guarantee as it applies to the scope of government speech. Norton
draws support for her principle from the Court’s early and
repeated references to the government’s accountability “to the
electorate and the political process” as the safeguard against
abuse.20 The Court’s vision of accountability, however, looks to
the legitimacy of the processes that produce the speech program,
and the visibility within enacted law of the government as the
source of the speech. To support her specific vision of
transparency, which depends upon a concept of accountability
under which listeners must understand the government source of
the speech as they receive it, Norton must draw from the
dissenting and concurring comments of Justice Souter, and more
general democratic theory (pp. 35, 38).
So, as a contested option, the transparency principle, and the
particular concept of accountability that underpins it, together are
like one of the “approaches” that structure the thinking Norton
seeks to provoke and guide through the second-stage framework.
But the two frameworks are not parallel. The first-stage
framework is advocacy. The second-stage framework, for the
most part, is not. As I went back and forth between the different
types of presentations, the first argumentative and filled with
authority, the second gently coaxing consideration of options for
moving the law to new places, I found myself imagining a stagetwo narrative at stage one. If the transparency principle is so
obviously the means to deliver the accountability that everyone
agrees underpins the government’s ability to select among
18. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private
Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 61 (2002) (“[I]n addition to being accountable to the
public generally for its effort to influence the speech market, the government must be
accountable to listeners who will be particularly affected by the communication.”).
19. See Agency for Int’l. Dev. v. All. for Open Society Intern., Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 216–
17 (2013) (discussing and distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
20. Pp. 33–34 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 235–36 (2000)).
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viewpoints when it speaks, and application of it so effortless for
the government, why won’t the Court interpret it into the
Constitution? Norton provides some hints of explanations.21 Free
speech experts can sketch for themselves the theories, or visions
of core purposes, that drive Norton’s conclusions and those of the
Court. But readers with less expertise may find themselves
yearning at stage one for the same careful, clear, nuanced
explanation from different fundamental understandings of
constitutional meaning to implications for doctrine that Norton
deploys so well in stage two.
To give a taste of the difference, I will narrow the stage one
question to which concept of accountability should determine the
scope of the government speech defense and briefly sketch an
alternate, stage-two-type presentation. This type of presentation
would begin with summaries of the core constitutional meanings
that Norton and the Court embrace and guided linkages between
those meanings and the rules they generate.22 Norton, I suggest,
understands the core free speech value to be political equality.
Under this view, the purpose of the clause is to promote the ability
of all citizens to participate meaningfully in democracy, power
differentials inherent in private ordering corrupt that purpose,
and so the Constitution permits, and sometimes requires, the
government to restrict the speech rights of powerful speakers to
promote the democratic ideal. By contrast, individual freedom to
participate without constraint in the competitive ideological
market is the ideal under the Court’s political liberty view.
Government tyranny by means of regulation is more likely to
corrupt the flow of ideas than the exercise of private power.
Citizens are best at taking care of their own interests and do not
need, or benefit from, paternalistic government efforts to adjust
the private speech market.
These core values trace to different conclusions about the
concept of accountability that must attach to government speech.
Norton’s concept of accountability looks to the relationship
21. E.g., p. 63 (providing some explanation of the reasoning the Court offered to
support its choice of a “wooden bright-line” “formalistic rule” to determine the scope of
government control over employee speech).
22. The two concepts of free speech Kathleen Sullivan drew from the majority and
dissenting opinions in the Citizens United v. FEC decision provide models for identifying
the core meanings that animate the different conclusions about the rules that should
determine the boundaries of government speech. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of
Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144–45 (2010).
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between citizen listeners and the government because this is
where the transaction critical to effectuating the democratic ideal
occurs. The government is a particularly powerful speaker,
inclined to obscure its identity for the purpose of skewing
messaging in its favor, to the detriment of citizen listeners’ equal
participation in democracy. The transparency principle,
interpreted into the Constitution by the Court, adjusts this power
dynamic.
For the Court, the only accountability that must attach to
government speech is the same process-based accountability that
validates other government actions. Citizen listeners have the
ability and responsibility to seek out the information they need to
understand the source of communications and make accurate
evaluations of the quality of the information and ideas they
receive. Efforts by the democratic branches of government to
restrict, supplement, or equalize the information listeners receive
are more likely to skew messaging and subvert the efficient
functioning of democracy than efforts by powerful speakers to
hide their identities. This conclusion is equally true with respect
to Court interpretations—like imposition of a transparency
principle—that burden the government’s expression within its
legitimate domain.
This altered presentation, I suggest, brings the subtle power
of the second-stage advocacy into stage one. Because advocacy it
is, albeit with a velvet touch. Despite Norton’s protestations that
she does not seek to persuade readers to a point of view at stage
two, her clear aim is to open readers’ minds to new options for
restricting government speech to promote political equality.
Exposing the core values that underpin the conservative and the
expansive views, and their implications in interpretation, forces
readers to examine and evaluate them. Tracing their linkage to
particular applications educates readers that such a link between
result and principle should exist in judicial decision-making, and
trains them to demand it when they examine judicial opinions
articulating constitutional doctrine. And for those who seek to
move from examination to action, it provides the tools to
understand and attempt to extricate the root of burgeoning
constitutional doctrine, rather than just swat at its discrete
manifestations.
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2. The Limits to Transparency
As Norton’s review reveals, the Court has applied the
government speech label to a number of different circumstances
in which the government and private individuals combine to
broadcast speech. Although this is not reflected in her sorting, the
circumstances can be grouped into instances where the
government commissions individuals to accomplish an objective,
which can be done, in part, by speech,23 and instances where the
government facilitates broadcast of privately generated messages,
by granting access to its property or through funding.24 The
transparency principle applies well to the first type of instance,
because the government source of the speech is likely to be
located within the programmatic mandate and not visible to the
listener absent doctrine that requires it. In application to this type
of commissioned speech, the transparency principle would
contract the availability of the government speech defense in
comparison to existing doctrine.
The second type of circumstance overlaps with private
speech forums.25 The government invites or otherwise agrees to
broadcast a wide range of privately generated viewpoints. The
government seeks to excise one or just a few of them because it
does not want to include that or those viewpoints. Resolution of
its power to do so hinges on characterizing the speech that it
broadcasts—is it the broadcast of individual messages or does the
broadcast create a combined message that is government speech?
The transparency principle, to the extent that it functions as a
mandate that the government disclose its role in broadcasting
speech, works less well to resolve this question than it does in the
context of commissioned speech, because, most frequently, the
government’s participation in producing the speech is apparent to
listeners. The question is whether the circumstances of the

23. Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (regulating abortion counseling provided by health care staff
in federally funded facilities); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)
(financing generic beef advertisements through required monetary contributions from
cattle producers).
24. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (placing private
monuments in public parks); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576
U.S. 200 (2015) (messaging of private groups on state license plates); Matal v. Tam, 137 S.
Ct. 1744 (2017) (trademarking name of musical group).
25. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (considering whether park monuments should be
analyzed under the precedent that applies to government speech or to private speech
forums).

JACOBS 36:1

168

7/6/2021 11:09 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 36:149

government’s obvious involvement transform the private
submissions into government speech.26 In these applications,
Norton’s preferred scope of availability of the government speech
defense aligns with current doctrine, and the transparency
principle does not distinguish the cases.
Once again, I suggest, application of Norton’s second-stage
methodology can assist here at stage one. The transparency
principle stems from the political-equality value. Reasoning from
that base value, or its alternative, can explain inclinations about
the scope of the government speech defense more fully than the
transparency principle alone in the forum-intersection
circumstances when citizen listeners’ need to understand the
genesis of the communication are met. So, as Norton explains in
much more depth, the triad of forum-intersection cases involved
park monuments, specialty license plates, and trademarks. The
Justices agreed unanimously that park monuments created and
donated by private groups to the government for display on its
property are government speech,27 and that trademarks are not.28
In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,29
the Court split 5–4, holding specialty license plates to broadcast
government speech. Norton agrees with this result in this close
case.
Facts matter when tracing results from core values. Free
speech libertarians and egalitarians are likely to view the
circumstances of the specialty license plate design selection
process differently. Texas claimed the right to exclude a
Confederate flag logo from its program that included 300+ other
designs. In response to the Confederate plate proposal, the Texas
Department of Motor Vehicles Board invited members of the
public to comment on its website and at a public meeting. After
considering the responses, the Board voted unanimously not to
approve the plate. It explained that “public comments ha[d]
shown that many members of the general public find the design
offensive, and because such comments are reasonable,” adding
“that a significant portion of the public associate the confederate
flag with organizations advocating expressions of hate directed

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. (looking to the “nature of [the government’s] conduct”).
Id.
Matal, 137 S. Ct. 1744.
576 U.S. 200.
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toward people or groups that is demeaning to those people or
groups.”30
To the dissent, animated by a political liberty understanding
of the free speech guarantee, this sequence of events appeared
like punishing flag burning—“government tyranny” exercised at
the expense of an individual’s right to express ideas, however
outrageous or offensive they may be to some members of the
public.31 Those like Norton, operating from a political equality
understanding, may see this sequence of events differently. With
speaker/listener transparency satisfied, those who value political
equality would ask whether recognizing this type of program as
producing government or individual speech would better fulfill
that value. The process might well appear to them as a political
community’s effort to acquire broad citizen input into what
meaning a proposed submission may send. And the result—as
opposed to the classic “heckler’s veto” that the dissent
perceives—they might view as the legitimate, and equalitypromoting excision from a collective broadcast of a message that
a “significant portion of the public” interprets as subordinating
other members of the community. Into the future, those who view
political equality as the Free Speech Clause’s animating value will
likely define the circumstances of government speech as
somewhat broader than political-liberty adherents, because they
will be more willing to see government broadcast of even a very
large number of contributions as a statement of collective
identity.32 So, as private parade organizers send a collective
message through the combination of units, even though the
organizers may not endorse the specific messaging of each, so,
too, can the government, in circumstances similar to these.33
B. STAGE TWO
Early on, Norton excises government regulation from her
sphere, seeking to focus our attention on the constitutional limits
that may apply to government speech “by itself” (p. 110). The
30. Id. at 206 (alteration in original).
31. Id. at 221 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision passes off private speech
as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a precedent that threatens private
speech that government finds displeasing.”).
32. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Government Identity Speech Programs: Understanding
and Applying the New Walker Test, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 305 (2017).
33. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995) (holding private organizers of St. Patrick’s Day parade could exclude gay group).

JACOBS 36:1

170

7/6/2021 11:09 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 36:149

excision is helpful in that it directs our thinking to the distinct
behavior of speech as a means by which the government may
accomplish its objectives, and causes us to focus on how
government speech may implicate the core meanings of various
constitutional provisions in the same way as its conduct, or
differently. Segregating government speech as a distinct means by
which the government may harm individuals creates a novel and
important perspective from which to consider the appropriate
scope of a number of constitutional rights guarantees. Yet, as I
read through the carefully sequenced sections, chapter by chapter,
each of which explores the characteristics of government speech
that should trigger constitutional liability, the cutaway of
government regulation of private speech seems too blunt.
The relevant characteristics of government speech that
Norton identifies are the harms caused by an instance of
government speech, including the standard of causation, and the
purpose for which it was uttered, and its motivation. Developed
doctrine establishes the circumstances under which the
government may, consistent with the Constitution, restrict
individual speech to avoid these same types of harms, or because
of the motivation behind the words. The doctrine implements
constitutional values that may or may not apply in the same way
to government speech. But as I, as a reader, am repeatedly asked
to evaluate which characteristics of government speech should
trigger constitutional liability, I find myself referring back to what
I know about the rules that apply to the government’s efforts to
limit private speech that has the same characteristics, to make the
comparison. So, too, readers less familiar with this doctrine that
Norton seeks to reach might benefit from the backdrop in some
places. I will mention a few of these.
One such place that suggests the comparison is in the subset
of examples of government speech that coerces or encourages
third parties to engage in conduct that would violate the
Constitution if the government compelled it directly. Subdivisions
direct readers’ attention to particular methods or targets of these
efforts, which helpfully segregate the readers’ thinking and, in the
order presented, roughly chart the efforts on a spectrum from
blatant lies that prompt third-party action to more gentle
encouragement to do so. The operative question is at what point
on the spectrum does the message sufficiently connect to the
conduct of third-party listeners so that the government speaker
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may be deemed responsible, under the Constitution, for
provoking the consequences of the third party’s conduct.
Identifying this point requires tracing free speech principles to
identify the circumstances that signal that the government’s
authority to avoid harm outweighs the value of the restricted
speech.
The doctrine surrounding incitement of unlawful action34 and
speech integral to crime35 provides these judgments when the
value in the balance comes from individual speech. These rules
provide a baseline for thinking about how the same free speech
principles should trace to rules when the type of harm is the same,
but the value in the balance comes from the government speech.36
The key characteristic that dictates the different rules of causation
that apply to the different types of private speech is its nature,
whether it is part of public discourse or merely instrumental. This
distinction identified explicitly and applied to the examples of
government speech aimed at influencing third-party conduct
could fruitfully sort them. For example, the due process chapter
begins with cases involving police deception of suspects in the
criminal justice setting, and moves through governmentmandated communications from doctors to patients about
abortion to election ballot statements (pp. 136–46). While it may
not be clear precisely where these communications fall on the
instrumental/public discourse speech spectrum, adding this
consideration to this sequence and others, helped me, and could
assist other readers, to consider the “[difficult] causal questions”
the third-party government speech cases raise (p. 110).
Another place that suggests the comparison is in the sections
asking whether and when government speech inflicts expressive,
or dignitary harm, such that it should trigger constitutional
liability even when it does not cause concrete harm. These
sections rely primarily on theory, with Norton offering
suggestions as to why the provision at issue might support such
liability, in some circumstances, and noting difficulties with the
theories and with identifying and proving the harm. Here, some

34. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. See Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2016).
36. YUDOF, supra note 3, at 260 (arguing that the “incitement standards under the
First Amendment . . . should be applied with far greater stringency to the utterances of the
government”).
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brief background as to the almost absolute constitutional
protection for the expression of ideas by individuals, and the few
intangible harms the Court has interpreted the Constitution to
allow the government to restrict individual speech to prevent can
assist readers to evaluate the liability and causation questions that
attach to government speech that may cause the same types of
harms. The distinction the Court has drawn between private
communications and those of public concern, with respect to
speech that defames, invades privacy, or intentionally inflicts
emotional distress,37 may help sort instances where the
Constitution should prohibit the government’s speech “inflicting
discriminatory expressive harm” from those where the potential
value of the speech, or the difficulty of identifying a determinate
meaning, dictates a different result (p. 113). Understanding the
broad protection for private expression of “thought that we
hate,”38 and the narrow fighting words exception,39 may also help
readers evaluate whether free speech values should trace to the
same results when the messages come from the government, or
whether particular constitutional provisions beyond the
Establishment Clause should be interpreted to restrict the
government from expressing certain ideas, in certain
circumstances.40
One more place that suggests comparison is in the sections
addressing government speech motivated by animus. For me,
understanding that the Constitution absolutely forbids regulating
what individuals say merely because of the thoughts that animate
the speech is critical to evaluating the proposals, with respect to
the various constitutional provisions, that government animus
should, in some circumstances, render speech that does not cause
concrete or tangible harms to the targeted individuals,
unconstitutional.41 The proposals are interesting and, as is their
purpose, thought provoking. Readers who do not understand the
37. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443 (2011).
38. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
40. P. 112 (“[D]oes the Equal Protection Clause deny the government the power
simply to say that its targets are inferior or second-class citizens because of their race or
other class status?”).
41. E.g., p. 152 (proposing that government speech intended to interfere with
abortion access may be unconstitutional because of that purpose even if the speech does
not actually impede access).
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novelty, however, of holding speakers liable for expressing ideas
merely because of their reasons for saying them, will lack
important information with which to assess the proposals, and
some of the commentary. For example, Norton notes that the
judges reviewing constitutional challenges to Confederate flag
displays “did not consider the possibility that the Equal
Protection Clause might forbid the government’s expressive
choice if motivated by the government’s animus or other
discriminatory purpose alone, absent any discriminatory change
in its targets’ choices or opportunities” (p. 124). Although values
drawn from the equal protection guarantee may mean that
different rules apply to the scope of government, as opposed to
individual speech, understanding the broad protection for
individually uttered statements of hate, and the constitutional
values the rule implements, provides important background to
considering the rules that should apply to government speech.
CONCLUSION
This book is an achievement. Norton has taken an area of
doctrine that many would not even think of as a discrete unit, and
made it her own. “[T]he government’s speech,” Norton argues
from the outset, “deserves our attention” because of all the good
things and, more urgently, because of all the bad things it can do
(p. 2). The call to attention is timely, and the support she offers
for it, cogent and captivating. A wide range of readers will refer
to it as a resource when they encounter government speech
questions in their legal research, or other fields, as they draft laws
or regulations, as they lobby for change, as they report on current
events or respond to media inquiries about them, and as they
notice the government’s speech, more and more, due to Norton’s
hard work and patient instruction, and seek a guide to what to
think about and how to do it. To the extent that my comments ask
for more, it is for more of a very good thing.
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